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Russian Drones Crash in Moldova 67 Times as Airspace Violations Soar

(CHIȘINĂU, MOLDOVA) – Moldova’s Defence Ministry recorded 67 airspace violation incidents in the first 10 months of 2026, including 19 in October alone, as Russian drone attacks against Ukraine spill across the border.

The incidents affected districts across Moldova, including areas near the Ukrainian border and several localities in the Russian backed breakaway region of Transnistria.

On 3rd October, drones crashed and exploded at five locations, including near the town of Țănățari and several villages in southern Moldova. Another explosion was recorded near a village in the north on 16th October.

Reuters reported that five drones identified by Moldovan authorities as Russian crashed within less than 24 hours in October, lightly injuring one person.

These incidents form part of a broader pattern. Moldovan authorities have documented 67 airspace violations since the beginning of 2026, compared with 104 recorded since Russia launched its full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

A Moldovan official said: “We have invested in the ability to detect threats that arise as a result of this war. We are now better at detecting them. We have invested and will continue to invest in radar systems.”

The official added that projects are underway to equip the armed forces with systems capable of shooting down drones or missiles that enter Moldovan territory.

Unlike neighbouring Romania, Moldova is not a NATO member and cannot rely on the alliance’s collective defence agreements. That makes the expansion of radar coverage, surveillance systems, and counter drone capabilities increasingly important.

Moldova’s Defence Ministry has called for additional investment in precisely these areas, warning that future incidents could threaten civilians and critical infrastructure.

The latest figures show how sharply the burden has grown. October alone accounted for 19 incidents, with six drones exploding on the ground. These are incident totals rather than a count of identical Russian attack drones. The broader historical record includes missiles and decoys as well.

Nevertheless, the consequences are concrete. Aircraft crossing the border can disrupt civilian aviation, damage property, and endanger residents.

Moldova experiences those risks without being the intended battlefield. Whether an aircraft was heading for Ukraine or deliberately routed through Moldova matters for attribution and intent, but for the family living near the falls, either explanation still leaves the same immediate problem: something is endangering their lives.

Moldova’s response includes plans to permit domestic production of military and dual use equipment. Parliament Speaker Igor Grosu says the country wants drones for its own needs, including security, emergencies, and agriculture, rather than supplying Ukraine.

Authorities describe a legal framework that would regulate private manufacturers. That remains distinct from evidence that an operational military factory already exists. In October, the government rejected reports about drone factories, while Grosu said legislation could be considered before year end if submitted in time.

Changing the law, attracting investment, establishing production, and supplying usable equipment are separate steps. None should be presented as completed because officials have announced an ambition.

A proposed factory cannot intercept the drone flying in today. Domestic production might eventually help, but the immediate protection of communities depends on equipment already available or capable of being deployed.

The proposed industry has also become a target for political allegations. Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has accused Moldova of becoming an anti Russian platform. Russian officials have alleged existing drone production, while Moldova has disputed reports about such factories.

This is part of Moscow’s broader warnings about European facilities supplying Ukraine, describing veiled threats.

Every drone crossing forces Moldova to spend money, restrict flights, or send emergency crews to look for wreckage. Moscow does not have to name Moldova as a target for the country to pay the price of Russia’s war.

Kamil Całus, a senior fellow from the Department for Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova at the Center for Eastern Studies, said the intensity of incidents is immense.

He said: “We recently crossed the threshold of 100 incidents involving Russian drones, decoys, missiles. 23 of all those incidents happened this year. In October only we had 19 incursions. It’s happening almost every day.”

Całus said the main reason is Russia’s larger strategy towards Europe and the so called collective West. Russia is trying to scare Western partners of Ukraine, to show them that it is ready to escalate and increase the cost of this conflict.

He said Moldova is a very good place to show this will because it is not a NATO member, not an EU member state, and is basically deprived of any real anti drone defence. It does not even have an air force.

Całus said: “For Russia, it’s really easy to show this will to escalate by increasing the number of incidents in Moldova without really risking any significant repercussions.”

He added that the incidents are also used by the pro Russian opposition in Moldova to send a signal to the Moldovan electorate. The opposition says the pro Western Party of Action and Solidarity, which has ruled since 2021, is putting Moldova in danger by criticising Russia and helping Ukraine.

Całus noted the September incident when a Russian drone crossed over Chișinău airport, the only airport in the country, exactly when President Zelensky’s plane was on the ground and he was preparing to depart for Oslo.

He said: “That was definitely meant to send a signal. Guys, you allowed President Zelensky to use this airport. You’re kind of cooperating with him. It will not go unnoticed. It will not go unpunished. This time this drone only passed by, but who knows what can happen.”

Całus said the tactic works both ways. For pro Russian voters, it is an argument to vote for pro Russian parties. For pro European voters, it is an argument to accelerate accession to the EU or even to support reunification with Romania.

He said: “If, God forbid, something terrible would happen, if one of those drones will finally hit some apartment block, if some people will die on the ground, this issue will become really important and it will influence part of the electorate.”

Całus said Moldovans are generally anti war but do not want to pick sides. They want to keep as far as possible from the war, a mentality that is easy to understand given the size and ability of the country to defend itself.

On Moldova’s path towards the EU, Całus said Moldova accelerated its diversification in 2022. Paradoxically, all Russian attempts to bring countries in the region closer to Russia backfired and pushed Moldova away.

Moldova became a candidate state willing to join the EU by 2030, which would be hard but possible. It could close negotiations by 2028.

Moldova also managed to completely decouple from Russian energy sources. Before 2022, Moldova was importing 100 per cent of its gas from Russia and consuming 80 per cent of its electricity from a Russian owned power plant in Transnistria. It is now buying gas on European markets and electricity from Western suppliers, mostly Romania.

Moldova has also started to pay more attention to politics of memory, educating its population about the true face of the Soviet regime and the atrocities committed on Moldovan territory during and after the Second World War.

Całus said this is important because Russia still uses pro Soviet sentiment and the fact that many Moldovans tend to think in the way shaped in Soviet times that Russia was always the good guy.

Moldova is also trying to reinforce the Romanian language in the country. Romanian is the official language, but Russian was still very popular for the last 30 years. According to statistics, over 50 per cent of minorities, who form around 20 per cent of the general public, cannot speak the official language. In Gagauzia, a very pro Russian region in the south, only 12 per cent of all people can speak proper Romanian.

Całus said this makes them very susceptible to Russian propaganda. They tend to watch Russian news and read Russian websites. This is also changing. Moldovan authorities are not fighting with the Russian language or trying to ban it, but they are trying to provide free Romanian language courses and increase Romanian language content on TV.

In other news from the region, Russia’s public healthcare system is facing growing financial pressure. The mandatory health insurance fund is projected to accumulate a deficit of roughly $4.5 billion (approximately £3.5 billion) over the next three years.

Under the proposed 2027 budget, federal healthcare spending will fall by 3 per cent while funding for cancer treatment programmes will be cut 12 fold. Spending on hospital and clinic infrastructure will also decline by 30 per cent.

Russian lawmaker Alexei Kurinny says total public healthcare expenditure remains at around 3.6 per cent of GDP, significantly below levels in developed countries. He warned that chronic underfunding is contributing to high mortality rates and Russia’s worsening demographic crisis. The country’s natural population decline is expected to reach around 600,000 people this year.

Russia’s central bank has become the world’s largest seller of gold reserves for the second consecutive quarter. According to the World Gold Council, Russia sold nearly 19 tonnes of gold in the third quarter of 2026, while central banks worldwide collectively purchased more than 320 tonnes. Russia’s gold reserves have fallen by approximately 62 tonnes since December, marking the country’s largest selloff since the 1998 financial crisis.

The sales come as Moscow increasingly draws on its national wealth fund to cover government spending, with this year’s budget deficit expected to reach nearly $89 billion (approximately £70 billion). Meanwhile, China has become a major destination for Russian gold exports, with shipments through Hong Kong reaching record levels as Western markets remain largely closed to Russian suppliers.

Ukraine and Moldova are expected to make further progress towards EU membership next year. Although Moldova is moving significantly faster in implementing the required reforms, according to new European Commission road maps, Moldova could close 24 of the 33 accession negotiating chapters in 2027, compared with just seven for Ukraine.

Brussels describes Moldova’s goal of concluding negotiations by early 2028 as ambitious but achievable while warning that Kyiv must accelerate reforms to meet its own end of 2028 target. Moldova has made particularly strong progress on rule of law requirements, an area where Ukraine continues to face challenges. However, the commission says Ukraine’s reform momentum has recently accelerated despite the ongoing war.

Both countries are expected to open their final negotiating clusters in December, although their accession processes may increasingly advance at different speeds.

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