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Ukraine needs a Starshield alternative. Can Europe deliver? | DW News

(KYIV) – Ukraine says renewed limits on Starshield, the military-grade version of Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite internet service, are allowing more Russian drone attacks to get through.

Ukraine uses the technology for intercepting Russian drone attacks and for launching its own strikes. Last month, Ukraine experienced a week of disruption to the service, severely hampering military operations. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk acknowledged that his company had throttled Starshield, but it is unclear who gave the order and why.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said a military investigation established that disruptions to Starshield were not random errors.

“We have detected speed restrictions on Starshield on our Ukrainian territory again, in the temporary occupied parts of Ukraine. The speed limit is back at 161 km per hour, that’s 100 miles per hour,” he said.

“This directly affects our ability to intercept Russian jet powered Shahed drones. These drones come from those areas and because of the speed restrictions, we simply cannot catch up with them in time and this means more Russian strikes get through and more of our people are killed, our civilians are killed by Russia.”

Zelenskyy said Ukraine is trying to get the details from the American side but so far knows very little. He said some things are already clear.

“If someone in America is making decisions that basically treat Ukrainian territory as if it is not Ukrainian, then this tells us where things are going,” he said.

The recurrent Starlink outages have highlighted a major problem for Ukraine: the risks of relying on American satellite technology that can be switched off at whim. To reduce that dependence, Kyiv is hoping for a European alternative.

Thomas Whittington, an analyst and writer at the Royal United Services Institute specialising in electronic warfare, radar and military communications, said the issue of service restrictions is not new and keeps cropping up.

Part of the reason may be that SpaceX took a decision some time ago to eliminate Starlink and Starshield coverage over Russia itself, which stopped the Russians accessing the system. The Russian military was never given permission to access Starlink, and Starshield is a Pentagon system.

Whittington said the decision was taken to restrict coverage over Russian occupied parts of Ukraine, and it sounds like that has persisted and continued. But it is now possibly impacting Ukrainian military operations, which would not necessarily be surprising given the offensive into those Russian areas.

On how dependent the Ukrainian military has become on Starlink and Starshield, Whittington said Zelenskyy’s continued pronouncements indicate how important both systems are to ongoing operations.

The two major uses are military communications at the tactical edge near the front line, between units and from those units back to headquarters, and drone operations. Starlink is indispensable to both, which is why any service disruption has an operational and tactical impact on day to day war fighting.

On who controls access to Starshield, Whittington said Starshield is owned and operated by the Pentagon, a US Department of Defense responsibility. SpaceX developed, designed, built and launched the system and then effectively handed over the keys.

Starlink is different and is owned and operated by SpaceX. Somebody somewhere ultimately controls both systems: in the case of Starshield it is the Pentagon, and in the case of Starlink it is SpaceX.

Whittington said when the initial restrictions were reported there was an adverse public reaction in the United States and in countries supportive of Ukraine. It may be that a decision was enacted by Musk and Trump and his advisers, and they are now frantically trying to roll back, realising how unpopular it has been. But they might not necessarily be introducing full functionality back to the Ukrainians.

On European alternatives, Whittington said there is no silver bullet, no single system that can be switched on and instantly provide the capabilities of Starlink and Starshield.

What Europe has is a combination of systems which, when used together, would provide similar performance and in some cases perhaps even better than what is currently offered by the United States.

He cited Eutelsat, which has Starlink-like performance but far fewer satellites in orbit. With Starlink and Starshield there are so many satellites that coverage is effectively continuous. With Eutelsat there are hundreds rather than thousands, so revisit rates reduce connectivity, which is a key problem when connecting drones that need commands sent very quickly.

There are also a number of private sector providers offering secure satellite communications networks used by governments and militaries in Europe. Some are very good at handling lots of data but need large antennas, which are not conducive to being put on drones but are fine for troops deployed in the field.

The European Union’s Govsatcom initiative aggregates several satellite communication systems across the continent and provides them like a bundle of services, similar to a mobile phone contract.

Whittington said European industry absolutely can produce something as good as or better than Starlink. There is the industrial capacity, but it takes time and money. The know how is not in doubt, but the political commitment is always problematic.

On whether Ukraine currently has alternatives, Whittington said it depends on the disruption. A nationwide jamming attack against Starlink, which fortunately has not been seen in Ukraine yet, would become very problematic, but such an action is probably beyond the Russians at the moment, short of a cyber attack, which they have done in the past and was rapidly remedied.

For piecemeal tactical level small scale disruption, there is invariably an alternative, though it might not be ideal. An important part of military communication survivability is building in alternatives.

Looking beyond Ukraine, Whittington said the most important lesson is to be very careful about leaving an essentially vital strategic capability in the hands of one individual or one company.

That model has been attractive because it shifts financial risk onto the company developing and implementing the network, with governments buying in access as needed. But Musk can be somewhat erratic, and that impacts the sense of reliability.

Whittington said governments need to own the capability completely: go to the private sector and ask them to build and launch it, but once done, it is the government’s system with no further input.

He said this is an important lesson to be learned across NATO, not just Europe. The US is acutely aware of it now as well, and other countries will be too.

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