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Why Russia and China aren’t really best friends | DW News

(MOSCOW, RUSSIA) – Russia is facing growing economic and strategic dependence on China as Western sanctions compel Moscow to rely heavily on Beijing for trade, technology, consumer goods, and critical military components, according to expert assessments published by DW News on 16th November 2026.

The largest country in the world by landmass, which holds the largest nuclear arsenal, now leans on its eastern neighbour to keep its economy running, supply its population with consumer goods, and arm its soldiers fighting in Ukraine.

Just before Russia launched its full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping proclaimed a partnership with no limits.

Following massive Western sanctions, Beijing stepped in as a crucial economic lifeline, creating an asymmetric relationship where Moscow needs Beijing far more than Beijing needs Moscow.

More than 30% of all Russian imports now originate from China, while that figure surges to roughly 90% for sensitive high technology items, including precision machine tools, microelectronics for weaponry, and jet engines powering Russia’s newest Geran drones.

While bilateral commerce generates tens of billions of US dollars annually, translating to trillions of Russian Rubles, hundreds of billions of Chinese Yuan, and tens of billions in British Pounds and Euros, analysts warn this dependency gives China tremendous economic leverage.

This growing imbalance fuels deep anxiety in Moscow regarding its neighbour of 1.4 billion people compared to Russia’s population of 140 million along a shared 4,000 kilometre border.

The Trans Siberian Railway, which has connected Moscow to the Pacific since 1916 across eight time zones, remains the primary transport artery linking Russian industry, population centres, military bases, and ports to this frontier.

In Khabarovsk, a city of roughly 600,000 people situated along the railway, historical tensions linger from the mid 19th century when Russia seized vast territories from a weakened Qing dynasty under agreements still remembered in China as the unequal treaties.

Those historical grievances erupted into armed conflict in 1969 when Soviet and Chinese troops fought over a small island in the Ussuri River, roughly 200 kilometres from Khabarovsk, bringing both nations to the brink of nuclear war after Moscow triplicated its border forces to nearly 40 divisions and informally sounded out Washington on potential nuclear retaliation.

Although Russia settled a lingering island dispute opposite Khabarovsk in 2008 by handing over territory where China later constructed an 81 metre tower, Russian eastern military forces have recently been heavily depleted.

Satellite imagery reveals that Russia has stripped troops from its Chinese frontier at levels unseen in a century, deploying units such as the Khabarovsk based 64th Motorised Rifle Brigade to Ukraine in 2022, where the unit is alleged to have taken part in the Bucha massacre in Kyiv Oblast.

Meanwhile, cross border trade infrastructure continues to expand, exemplified by the first major road bridge connecting Russia and China across the 600 metre wide Amur River, which opened in 2022 and allows visa free crossings alongside expanding freight rail networks, oil tankers, and pipelines.

Further east in Vladivostok, the headquarters of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, Beijing has increasingly utilised the deep water Pacific port as a domestic cargo shortcut for goods travelling from China’s northeastern provinces to southern China.

Despite public displays of unity, severe institutional distrust persists beneath the surface, highlighted in 2023 when Beijing ordered Chinese maps to include the historical Chinese names for Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, sparking nationalist debates on Chinese social media about reclaiming lost imperial territory.

In 2025, a leaked top secret intelligence report cited by The New York Times revealed that Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) explicitly referred to China as the enemy and warned of Chinese espionage and potential future territorial claims.

While Chinese hackers have reportedly spent years penetrating Russian technology firms tied to critical industry and defence, Russian counterintelligence officers were ordered to seek high level approval before taking sensitive action against Beijing.

Additional leaked documents demonstrate that Moscow maintained contingency plans to use tactical nuclear weapons against a potential Chinese invasion until at least 2014, operating suspected Iskander missile facilities such as the 107th Missile Brigade less than 100 kilometres from the Chinese border.

While Chinese officials flatter Russian sensitivities by avoiding hierarchical labels and praising Russian martial culture behind closed doors, Beijing is actively cultivating institutional ties across Russian political parties to safeguard its interests in a post Putin era.

Geopolitical experts conclude that if Russia fails to mend ties with the West, Moscow faces a stark future either as a permanent junior partner to Beijing or as an isolated pariah state resembling North Korea.

 

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