Press "Enter" to skip to content

Europe Sidelined as US and Russia Talk Security, Prisoner Exchange Planned but Not Agreed

(WARSAW) – The first direct Russia-Ukraine negotiations in nine months have produced modest results and a planned major prisoner exchange that has not been agreed, but European capitals are alarmed that the talks could yield a security settlement imposed on them without their participation.

Delegates from France, Germany, Britain, Italy, the EU and NATO travelled to Abu Dhabi only to loiter on the sidelines in separate consultations. Moscow opposed their participation, making clear it has little interest in talking to them.

Europe, not just Ukraine, is on the menu of prospective changes, according to Klara Syrewicz, who hosted an On Air discussion with Witold Rodkiewicz, chief specialist on Russia at the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw. The talks concern not just Ukraine’s future but the whole security architecture of Europe.

The Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has spent years portraying NATO’s eastern presence as a threat. Before invading Ukraine, Moscow demanded that NATO pull its forces out of every country that joined after 1997, including Poland, the Baltics, the Czech Republic and several others.

US President Donald Trump appears increasingly willing to oblige Moscow’s long-standing demands as part of a grand bargain. Jared Kushner has spoken of practical arrangements addressing the security concerns of all sides, language that treats Russia as an ordinary country with legitimate concerns rather than an invader that has violated every previous international agreement and deliberately targets civilians.

Rodkiewicz said the new element in this round is Russia’s push on the so-called European security order, a revisionist project dating to the end of the Cold War. Moscow is reviving demands made in December 2021, just before its full-scale aggression against Ukraine. The draft treaties it offered the United States and NATO provided for the demilitarisation of central Europe, removal of NATO forces from states that joined after the Cold War, and the conversion of central and eastern Europe into a Russian buffer zone.

Rodkiewicz said it is the Russians, not the Americans, who are refusing to allow Europeans into the negotiations. The US team was explicit about wanting to invite Europe and one of its stated goals is to persuade Putin, as Kushner put it, to allow Europeans to join. From Moscow’s perspective, keeping Europeans out allows it to talk to the Americans separately and hope Washington makes concessions at Europe’s expense.

Russia has little reason to stop fighting if it can maintain military pressure and receive concessions from Washington such as sanctions waivers.

Paradoxically, Russia’s position is weakening in terms of fighting power and its financial reserves are close to exhaustion. It faces mounting internal economic problems. That should push the Kremlin toward compromise, but the opposite is happening: the Russian position has hardened, as statements by the Russian delegation before and after the talks made clear.

To push Russia to see the advantages of a compromise exit, Rodkiewicz said pressure must increase: broader and more intense economic sanctions, more military aid to Ukrainian forces, confiscation of Russian financial assets frozen in western institutions, tougher enforcement, and secondary sanctions on intermediaries, a tool the US has used but Europe has refused.

Europe’s position is weak because it lacks a sole representative and does not speak with one voice. Rodkiewicz questioned whether Europeans joining the negotiations would be advisable, since it would lend them additional legitimacy. Europe is neither in the negotiations nor against them, nor does it condemn them, and there are many differences behind the scenes.

He said the negotiations are pointless because the Russians will not negotiate in good faith and are not interested in compromise, as they state openly. The head of the Russian delegation, Medinsky, said Russia is interested in absolute victory and signing a peace agreement on Russian terms.

Rodkiewicz described the Russian philosophy of negotiating as stating a maximum position and holding it while counting on the other side to concede, then asking for more. For Moscow, negotiations are part of a toolbox that includes military action and propaganda.

Europe joining the talks risks creating the illusion that a compromise peace can be achieved without mobilisation and without increasing pressure, distracting it from policies that would maximise pressure on Russia. Europeans are placed in the position of suitors begging the other side to join, while the other side holds control.

That posture convinces the Russian elite that Europeans are weakening, encouraging them to persevere in the belief that Europe will fold.

On the risk of binding outcomes, Rodkiewicz said Article Five style guarantees for Ukraine are completely unacceptable to Russia and will not happen, while nobody on the European or American side is willing to offer them. Kushner floated the idea without understanding what he was talking about.

The real danger is an agreement between the Trump team and the Russians on elements of American military presence in Europe. These sides cannot create binding obligations for the rest of NATO and EU members, but Washington could make concessions concerning only itself and then present Europeans with consolidated demands backed by both the US and Russia.

Examples include reducing western military activity in eastern flank countries or the military presence of other NATO members in central Europe, such as not deploying a German brigade in Vilnius. Resisting would be difficult because Europeans depend on the US for security, and Rodkiewicz sees no way for Europe to exert pressure on Washington.

Russia also treats the talks as a way to sustain the Trump administration’s illusion that a deal is possible, working on Trump’s psychology while making no concessions. Rodkiewicz said Moscow would be willing to sell lucrative assets to Trump’s entourage.

He said the Trump administration’s motivation to end the war is real and sincere, since it has made possible business and economic deals with Russia dependent on ending the war. The Americans could exert far greater pressure by enforcing sanctions, including the new Grime bill passed by Congress, but Trump does not want to use it, though he has not revoked earlier sanctions and extended them to two important Russian firms.

Trump believes excessive pressure would be counterproductive, a position Rodkiewicz called fundamentally mistaken.

The two sides are acting on very different assumptions about what motivates the other, and their vectors are misaligned. Rodkiewicz said no deal is possible.

Be First to Comment

Leave a Reply